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By stephen a. saltzBurg
Lawyers are expected—indeed required—to make the right objection to evidence of-fered at trial if  they expect to win an evi-
dence fight and to preserve an issue for appeal in 
the event they lose the fight at trial. In most in-
stances, the right objection is obvious, especially 
to experienced counsel, and the real challenge is 
to raise it timely and clearly. But, there are cases 
in which crafting the right objection can be tricky.
an illustrative case
United States v. Davis, 596 F.3d 852 (D.C. Cir. 
2010), is an example of a case in which choosing 
the right objection was more difficult than in the 
mine-run case. Terry Davis had been the national 
treasurer of the Phi Beta Sigma fraternity. He was 
charged with 10 counts of bank fraud, one count 
of first-degree theft, and one count of first-degree 
fraud. A jury acquitted him on two bank fraud 
counts and convicted him on all the other counts.
The fraternity was founded at Howard Univer-
sity in 1914 and over the years developed univer-
sity and alumni chapters with more than 120,000 
members who pay annual dues that are deposited 
in a general fund bank account and are used to 
pay the fraternity’s operating expenses. Davis was 
an elected, unpaid officer of the fraternity. In order 
to ensure that the fraternity’s funds were properly 
used, the fraternity had a policy that the fraterni-
ty’s executive director, its national president, and 
the national treasurer must each sign a voucher 
authorizing each payment, and the president and 
treasurer each must co-sign every fraternity check. 
Davis disregarded these policies and wrote checks 
without obtaining approved vouchers. Some 
checks contained only his signature, and he signed 
or stamped the president’s name on other checks.
When the fraternity investigated financial ir-
regularities and discovered what Davis had done, 
it suspended him and installed a new treasurer. 
The new treasurer found at least $29,000 in checks 
that had been made out to “cash” that was not 
deposited in the fraternity’s bank account. These 
checks gave rise to the prosecution.
the Defense
Davis’s defense was that the checks he had made 
payable to cash were deposited into his personal 
banking account and used to pay fraternity bills 
and to reimburse himself  for fraternity debts he 
had incurred using his personal funds. Although 
it might seem strange that Davis would write 
checks to cash and then turn around to use the 
money to pay fraternity expenses rather than pay 
them directly from the fraternity bank account, 
Davis testified that some vendors and banks were 
wary of dealing directly with the fraternity. Davis 
claimed that the fraternity had such a poor finan-
cial history that some vendors would not accept 
a fraternity check and that the fraternity’s bank 
denied access to newly deposited funds while a 
check cleared, which delayed payment of the fra-
ternity’s overdue bills. Davis explained that, in or-
der to deal with the fraternity’s financial problems, 
he would (1) write a fraternity check to cash; (2) 
deposit the check in his personal account; (3) ei-
ther write a personal check or use the proceeds to 
purchase a money order; and (4) remit the check 
or money order to a vendor, a separate fraternity 
bank account, or to a fraternity officer entitled to 
reimbursement of expenses.
the corroborative Witness and the  
evidence Objection
The witness upon whom Davis depended to cor-
roborate his testimony was his wife, Rhonda Da-
vis. The court of appeals described her testimony 
as follows:
Rhonda testified that she saw her husband 
working at home on fraternity business “on 
a very regular basis every day, most of [the] 
time, in some way, shape or form.” Asked 
about the “types of things” she saw him do-
ing, she replied that “I would see him work-
ing on his computer with spreadsheets. I 
would—I would even help him mail things. 
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I would see the money orders that had to 
be processed. I would wait for the Fed. Ex. 
man.” Defense counsel later asked Rhonda 
to elaborate further: “You talked about see-
ing Mr. Davis make payments for fraternity 
expenses. Can you tell me a specific instance 
when you saw him make a payment for a 
fraternity expense?” After she responded 
“Yes, I can,” the prosecutor objected.
(596 F.3d at 855.)
The government objected that Rhonda Davis 
lacked personal knowledge as to the reasons that 
Terry Davis wrote checks and made payments and 
that, in essence, she was merely repeating hearsay 
statements by Terry. The government conceded 
that Rhonda could testify from personal knowl-
edge that she saw her husband receive bills, write 
checks, and purchase money orders, but argued 
that any testimony about the nature of the docu-
ments and their purpose should be excluded un-
der Rule 403 as speculative and prejudicial.
The trial judge apparently thought the evidence 
issue was more difficult than most such issues and 
took up the government’s objection in a hearing 
the day after the government raised its objection. 
Both sides filed written memoranda and the trial 
judge and counsel questioned Rhonda out of the 
jury’s presence. Rhonda’s testimony focused on 
checks, money orders, and fraternity bills that she 
saw. The court of appeals described the testimony 
that occurred out of the jury’s hearing:
Rhonda stated that she saw Davis write 
checks to pay fraternity bills and expenses. 
But she could only recall one check that 
Davis wrote from his personal checking ac-
count to pay a fraternity bill. Asked how she 
knew this check was for a fraternity expense, 
she said her husband told her the check was 
“for fraternity stuff.” The court also asked 
Rhonda how she knew Davis was using 
money orders to pay fraternity bills. She re-
called asking Davis about the money orders 
“the very first time” she saw them at their 
home. He told her he used money orders to 
pay fraternity bills because some vendors 
would not accept the fraternity’s checks. 
Rhonda also testified on voir dire that she 
and her husband did not use money orders 
to pay household expenses, and that she saw 
bills from The Hartford and the utility com-
pany PEPCO, neither of which served her 
household. She did not claim to have seen 
Davis using money orders for any particular 
vendor other than The Hartford.
(Id.)
The trial judge ultimately sustained the gov-
ernment’s objection. The court of appeals noted 
the relationship between the personal knowledge 
and hearsay rules:
The Federal Rules of Evidence define hear-
say as an out-of-court statement offered 
for its truth and generally bar its admission 
into evidence. Fed. R. Evid. 801(c), 802. 
The Rules also prohibit a witness from tes-
tifying unless he has personal knowledge of 
the subject of his testimony. Fed. R. Evid. 
602. These provisions intersect if  a witness 
satisfies Rule 602’s personal knowledge re-
quirement by relying on the truth of an out-
of-court statement. “If  the testimony of the 
witness purports to repeat an out-of-court 
statement, hearsay is the proper objection. 
If  the testimony on its face purports to be 
based on direct perception of the facts de-
scribed but is actually based on an out-of-
court statement about those facts, the objec-
tion should be lack of personal knowledge.” 
* * * (Citations omitted.)
(596 F.3d at 856.)
The court added in a footnote that “[b]ecause 
the distinction between the two objections is 
based only on the form of the testimony, an ob-
jection invoking either rule is sufficient.” (Id. at 
n.2.) The footnote is almost certainly problemat-
ic, since a hearsay objection would generally not 
suffice to cover a witness’s testimony that involves 
speculation rather than reliance on a declarant’s 
statements.  It does highlight, however, the way 
in which hearsay and personal knowledge objec-
tions may relate to one another.
appellate resolution
The court ruled that Rhonda’s testimony about 
the one check she claimed to see her husband 
write to pay a fraternity bill was hearsay because 
she relied upon her husband’s out-of-court state-
ment regarding the purpose of the check. This 
analysis seems correct.
The court also recognized that generally 
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checks, bills, and money orders are not hearsay. 
They are not true or false. “They are legally op-
erative documents with a meaning independent 
of the truth of the words they display. . . . A $100 
money order made out to The Hartford instructs 
a financial institution to disburse $100 to The 
Hartford. It would make no sense to ask whether 
the money order was true.” (Id. at 856-57.)
But, the court held that the trial judge did 
not err in excluding some of Rhonda’s testimo-
ny about the money orders because on voir dire 
she said that she relied upon three things to de-
termine that the money orders were used to pay 
fraternity bills: (1) she saw money orders that her 
husband wrote to a vendor; (2) she and her hus-
band did not use money orders for household ex-
penses; and (3) her husband responded to a ques-
tion she asked about the money orders and said 
they were for fraternity bills. The court reasoned 
that “[t]o the extent Rhonda’s knowledge derived 
from what Davis told her, rather than from the 
practice of her household or the words written 
on the money orders, the district court properly 
excluded her proposed testimony regarding the 
money orders.” (Id. at 857.)
The court’s reasoning is again correct. Rhonda 
should have been permitted to testify as to (1) and (2) 
without any hearsay problem but not (3) because (3) 
simply relayed a hearsay statement from her husband.
As for the bills, the court rejected Davis’s argument 
that Rhonda should have been able to testify to what 
she saw and stated that the documents contained 
assertions—i.e., the sender and recipient labels—and 
the labels asserted facts that could be characterized as 
true or false. This analysis appears strained. Surely it 
was relevant that Davis had bills purporting to have 
been sent to the fraternity from a vendor. He testi-
fied to such bills and Rhonda’s testimony that she 
saw bills such as he described should have been ad-
missible to corroborate his version of events rather 
than for the truth of the matters stated on the bills. 
The court distinguished cases in which documents 
were shown to be in a certain location and were not 
hearsay when used to prove a connection with an in-
dividual and insisted that Rhonda’s testimony relied 
on the truth of the sender and recipient labels. Al-
though a hindsight analysis demonstrates that there 
was a clear nonhearsay purpose for Rhonda’s testi-
mony, the court’s failure to recognize this purpose is 
explained by “defense counsel’s failure to articulate a 
justification for Rhonda’s proposed testimony inde-
pendent of the labels’ truth.” (Id. at 858.)
What about Best evidence?
Although Rhonda’s testimony about the labels 
clearly could have been nonhearsay, it would have 
raised a best evidence problem had the govern-
ment made a best evidence objection. After all, 
Rhonda was trying to prove the contents of each 
bill. That triggers Fed. R. Evid. 1002. The court 
of appeals noted this in a footnote:
The policy underlying the best evidence 
rule, embodied in Federal Rule of Evidence 
1002, appeared to animate the district court’s 
judgment regarding Rhonda’s proposed tes-
timony. In requiring litigants to prove the 
contents of a writing by introducing the writ-
ing itself, the rule guards against inaccuracy, 
fraud, and incompleteness. . . . Rhonda’s tes-
timony regarding documents not introduced 
at trial would have raised these concerns. But 
the best evidence rule also affords litigants an 
opportunity to demonstrate that admission 
of secondary evidence is necessary because 
the writing itself is unavailable. Fed. R. Evid. 
1004. Because the government never made a 
best evidence objection, Davis was not called 
upon to produce the bills, checks, and money 
orders, although the court suggested that he 
should have done so.
lessons
1.  Counsel must make the right objection at 
trial. At times, it is unclear whether the right 
objection is lack of personal knowledge or 
hearsay. Davis suggests that either objection 
will do, but reliance on the footnote that 
says so is dangerous. When in doubt, pru-
dent counsel would do better to raise both 
objections.
2.  When a hearsay objection is made, the pro-
ponent of evidence bears a burden of dem-
onstrating that the evidence is offered for a 
purpose other than its truth. Failure to do 
so may result in exclusion of evidence that 
might have been admitted. Davis illustrates 
this point with respect to the bills.
3.  When testimony is offered to prove the con-
tents of documents, there may be a best evi-
dence problem even if there is no hearsay 
problem. Davis also illustrates this, although 
it is impossible to know whether Davis could 
have circumvented a best evidence objection 
given that none was made. n
